August 20, 2007 How to Spy in Iraq

Kinda long but very revealing - a good read.

Revealing... and depressing if you read the August 14th Balance of Terror post.

Front-line lessons from the Iraq surge

The nature of the efforts in Iraq are as follows:

It simply isn't possible to secure the country with the levels of troops that are deployed and the amount of money we devote to humanitarian aid, i.e. 'rebuilding.' If we had started things on the right foot instead of ignoring every lesson we've ever learned or heard about nation building, it would be a different story, but it's too late for a war that can be won with 160,000 troops (or whatever the exact number is).

"The good things" that the press "isn't reporting" are things that have little or no effect on the ultimate goal. Even today, with all of our lessons learned, our attempts at rebuilding are haphazard and aimless. What does an Iraqi care about a new school if their child can't attend it safely? The first and only thing we can worry about right now is nation-side security (i.e. the borders, and every major city in the country, not just Baghdad).

All the money we've pumped into things like the power grids and public works amount to nothing because they were given to contractors who were unable to do the jobs. Someone in the pentagon had a friend of a friend of a friend who had some company in Lubbock, TX (or take your pick) who jumped in over their heads, instead of being willing to source our efforts to European, Middle Eastern, or god help us Asian contractors.

I disagree wholeheartedly with the invasion of Iraq. It was a war for money and power, regardless of the ostensible reasons. However I also disagree with a withdrawal. Not for any prideful reasons ('We won't accept defeat!' usually ranks about as high as 'I swear I satisfy my wife' with me), or any security reasons, because frankly terrorism will not end our way of life, or even kill that many people people in the grand scheme of things. If/when we do withdraw from Iraq (which might not be a certainty), there will be some serious chaos and death, and this is why I can't get behind a 'leave Iraq now' policy. Treating Iraqis as dispensable while our troops are not... just wrong.

And one more thing, I swear to god, please, please, please stop assigning value to AQI. They are a near insignificant group when looking at the whole insurgency. They make up about 10% of the problem and we devote well over half of our resources on them. The instant we leave, the Iraqis will kick their sorry asses out, probably killing a large number of them, and they'll never be heard from again. Maybe if we worried a little more about the militias that saturate the entire country we'd get somewhere.

Where did you get that number from?

I know it has gone down since this was written (3/2/07) because IAI, 1920 and others have left Al Qaeda but I have heard up to 50% of insurgencies are aliened with Al Qaeda now.

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/20...02/insurgency/

Ok, the actual numbers of the insurgency are in dispute, and I shouldn't have put out a figure as being rock-solid. You can't judge on arrests made, because like I said we favor arresting Sunni groups and AQI guys. We can't just go around polling people because simple support does not equate to numbers (in fact, there are very VERY few non-AQI members who actually support AQI).

Also, if by IAI you mean Islamic Army of Iraq, never heard of them (at least not as an active group in Iraq). I don't know who this 1920 is either, but it's important to note that AQI is not an umbrella organization. AQI is a cell group comprised largely of foreign fighters (i.e. non-iraqi) and one of many groups under ISI, Islamic State of Iraq (which might have been what you meant by IAI, they change their name about twice a week). Because of the very loose and fluid ties that exist between foreign terrorist organizations, it's difficult to assign numbers to each group (oftentimes people will group all Sunni militias and terrorist organizations as AQI). The connection between AQI and UBL is even in dispute.

ISI is important to pay attention to, but the one major player (at least in central Iraq) is Jaysh al-Mahdi. They've got popular support and have many MANY ties to GOI both locally and nationally.

My main point in saying that people stop obsessing over AQI is that everyone attacks everyone, and al-Qa'ida is pulling most of the US's attention because they have the same name as the group accused of the terrorist attacks on us (when in reality the connection is fragile at best). If we want to quell an insurgency, we need to step back and evaluate our priorities... AQI isn't really one of them.

And I wouldn't pay much attention to that article, he makes several kind of stupid points... he uses semantics to group several orgs under al-Qa'ida and manages to draw a definite line between 'insurgent' and 'terrorist' which is something that most CI experts wouldn't touch with a ten foot pole.

.. and I take back what I said about IAI, I had heard of them, just not in english...:o

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920_Revolution_Brigade
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Army_in_Iraq

Bush & Co are in the habit of calling every terrorist/insurgent cell, Al Qaeda with the equivalency of 'bad guys'.
To confuse the issue more, many of the cells are calling themselves Al Qaeda, in an effort to give themselves street creds and to manipulate the press... something they are very good at.

That said, to the combat commanders, it doesn't make any difference what you call them, or they call themselves. The commanders only have to know who's shooting at them and not fuck with people who are not. They know they can't win this war, only the Iraqis can do that.

The 1920s Brigade are not our friends. Currently they are working with US troops, in some areas, where they don't have the ways and means to oust the oppressive, Iranian backed groups. But as soon as that's accomplished, they want us out and they feel that's much easier than ridding themselves of Islamic invaders.

European, Middle Eastern, or Asian contractors, couldn't do the job either. It behooves the 'bad guys' to disrupt as much infrastructure and services as they can. With millions of troops, it would still be impossible to guard everything, all the time. It's much faster and easier to destroy shit than to build it.

Yeah, I agree with you. I didn't mean to imply that any contractors could pull it off now, just that incompetent contractors with no foreign experience effed things up in the beginning of the war, when there was little security problems with the public works construction.

And with a larger number of troops it would be possible to secure the country, history is riddled with successful counter insurgency campaigns, but all the ones that worked had adequate resources. The usual approximation is that 3-4 hundred thousand troops plus equal contractors could do the job, because while you're correct about guarding every street corner, the modern military has impressive capabilities including an intelligence apparatus. With various intelligence disciplines it's possible to track the 'bad guys' therefore we'd only have to protect a small number of targets full time.

In addition, those are only the foreign troops. A major part of a good campaign would be retraining and re outfitting the ING and Police (hopefully using SF for it's real purpose instead of the purpose assigned by a secdef who watched too many rambo movies). It would take several years and more resources than are currently employed, but it could be done.

Many successful programs did not use massive numbers of troops nor solve problems with money. In each case, a military objective is only to return the dispute to a peace table. But a peace table will not be fruitful if the reasons for that insurgency are not addressed.

Why were insurgencies in Indonesia and Thailand easily defeated? The reasons for those insurgencies were eliminated with social, economic, and political solutions - not military.

Money does not solve problems. Money is only one tool. Throwing money at any problem like a grenade is money completely wasted. Vietnam and General Motors are two classic examples of money wasted. A solution starts by first identifying the problem and then solving that problem. Whereas money is required, still, money can neither identify a problem nor define a solution.

Money is a tool - a scapel. Does the blindfolded doctor throw scapels in all directions hoping he will fix a heart? And yet that is exactly what happened in Nam - as every soldier who served there with his eyes open can testify.

Some people must wait to learn what was obvious in April 2006. Some confuse tactical victories with winning a war. Well wait. Wait because in a couple of days, another analysis, this time by the Government Accountability Office, will be released.

The report will demonstrate that sectarian violence makes reconciliation almost impossible. That American stupidity started making things worst about the time that Saddam was captured. Because reporters, accused of only reporting bad news, did not robustly report that reality. An ignored 'in the press' problem that Americans can no longer resolve. Fundamental problems that were only exasperated by American ignorance are demonstrated: Insurgencies can only be terminated by resolving the problems. There never was a military solution to insurgencies. None of these problems entrenched by Americans can be resolved by Americans.

But then what has been accomplished? The electrical system is on the verge of collapsing. Much of it is now controlled by insurgencies. The British are now being driven out of central Basra - another defeat. Insurgents even used the electrical system to attack and defeat that British base.

What was supposed to be already fixed must be torn apart and reconstructed. Those who grasped military principles for a victory were also hearing this from reporters. Those in denial have been preaching 'light at the end of the tunnel' myths. Those who still foolishly believe victory can be achieved are even denying why Iraq has is in civil war. So they even invent another myth - calling all insurgent Al Qaeda. And that's the bottom line. The strategic objectives cannot be achieved. Petraeus, just like in Nam, can win every battle, and still not win the war. America is again supporting a government that does not represent the interests of a nation.

Scowcroft (one of George Sr's closest friends who was probably echoing George Sr's opinions) predicted an Iraqi Civil War. New Cellar dwellers can search here for that name to see how long ago reality was understood - how long ago some were denying reality.

None of this disparages Gen Petraeus. Petraeus repeatedly said he cannot achieve a strategic victory - only make it possible for one to happen. But then one need only view how deep the animosity is between Sunnis and Shia because America did not resolve that problem almost five years ago - the only time that problem could have been resolved. Of course, that means a president with some intelligence - who could plan for the peace - who understood by America must do nation building. Today's problems could only be resolved back them.

How curious. Things we do today only show up on the spread sheets four and more years later. Four years after creating an American defeat, it is even appearing in the numbers. Remember those soldier don't decide to go to war. We send them. Four years ago, this is what we did to the American soldier:
The Lost Year
Yes, it takes almost one hour to view. But to understand the loss of "Mission Accomplished", one should learn why. Nothing better explains why a defeat in "Mission Accomplished" is obvious. That was the only time this simmering conflict could have been avoided. Americans can no longer solve it - no matter how many dollars are thrown at the problem like a grenade.

Gee and you quoted your own stupid suggestion from another thread - thats pretty good. Ya freakin pessimist.

What I think you're misunderstanding about my opinion is that I'm not suggesting a military solution anymore than I'm suggesting 'throwing money at a problem.' You said it yourself, the military and the money are tools... but how are you going to do the job if the tools are inadequate?

If we had deployed sufficient troops we could have
a) secured the borders to prevent an ingress of foreign fighters
b) prevented looting in business districts vital to the economy
c) protected the infrastructure from collapse

The low troop numbers now still contribute: we don't have enough men to patrol the borders, fight the insurgency, AND protect the infrastructure, but it COULD BE DONE with enough manpower. Also, with better use of each man on the ground (i.e. focusing more on SF training ING than on blowing up bad guys, and operation on high value low risk targets instead of massive arrests) and intelligence control, we can secure the country.

And Patraeus is correct: this can only provide the opportunity to succeed. The reason I suggest that we need gobs more money is NOT because we would be spending willy nilly on fruitless projects, but because this damaged electricity grid will take vast amounts of investment in Baghdad alone. The level of deterioration has skyrocketed and will take a lot of money.

So with security and general comfort taken care of only then can we worry about political reconciliation. I think you'd be amazed how few people will still be violent with their families well fed, their houses air conditioned, and their businesses not closed for fear of attack. IT would still take years of policy building and arrangement, but with the members of parliament not scared to leave their homes, it will be easier to stay in session.

It is not impossible to fix this, it will just now take far better and robust tools than it would have had we not effed up. Not every military effort is misguided, not every spending effort is a waste. I don't have the time to watch the video, so if this is redundant I apologize.