The Cellar - Afghanistan

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This is a great report by Yon concerning US/UK relations and a snapshot of the condition of the fight with our international brothers in arms.

Red Flag

A missive arrived to me from a well-placed British officer. I know this officer well, and respect his abilities. He has been to both Iraq and Afghanistan. In part, the missive said:

“Please have a look at the attached from the UK Times. Regarding the Rachel Sylvester piece, we have not been able to find any such document/memo although it is possible that an e-mail exists somewhere that refers to such a matter – more likely to be a warning not to dick about regarding what extra troops the UK might be able to find for AFG and raise unrealistic US expectations.”

Rachel Sylvester US doubts about UK military effectiveness 6 Jan 09.pdf

The Special Relationship Times leader 7 Jan 09.pdf
The words imply that the US-UK relationship is fraying. This is untrue as seen from the foxholes I am constantly in. I have embedded with numerous British units in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have seen combat with all of those units. Maybe five or so. The units included 2 Rifles, 4 Rifles, Queen's Royal Lancers, Duke of Lancaster's, 2 Para, and I believe perhaps a couple more though there was much going on and it’s difficult to remember.

What I can say, is that the significant combat I saw with British soldiers made me respect them more with each battle. Yes, it’s true their gear needs serious upgrading. The British government needs to spend billions to upgrade the hardware. But when it comes to the soldier, British soldiers are extremely well-trained, courageous and ready for a big firefight at the drop of a hat. Our brothers and sisters are vastly outnumbered at Helmand Province in Afghanistan. I think about them several times a day and am concerned that they might take serious losses this year.

When the question comes up about what Americans think about our closest ally, I ask MANY American soldiers what they think of the British. There are mixed opinions of course, but the bottom line is that American combat veterans greatly respect British soldiers. The British just need better gear. Another well-placed British Army officer recently told me while I was in Afghanistan that the British have plenty of helicopters. I did not respect those words, though I was told by an important American officer that this British officer is very good. “Don’t bullshit me, sir,” I replied only in my head. “I Don’t like BS.” The British need more helicopters. The American and British soldiers know this. A problem with the British soldiers is similar to a problem with our own Marines. They refuse to complain, so they get leftovers. A retired Australian officer of great significance asked me what I thought of British soldiers. I said something to the effect of, “My opinion is suspect because I greatly respect British soldiers…” If I did not respect British soldiers, I would not keep going into combat with them.

{continues}

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

My cousin is hoping to get over there shortly. He already did one stint but he wants to go again. Might not pass the medical this time though. His knees are fucked.

Stanley's Afghan? [/giant rat of sumatra]

Looks like Yon might be suing Michael Moore.. awesometastic.

Michael Moore is definately a dick. I would love to Yon or anyone take him to the bank and leave the guy homeless on the streets of NY.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bullitt (Post 521765)

Looks like Yon might be suing Michael Moore.. awesometastic.

Link/info please...

Quote:

Originally Posted by classicman (Post 521885)

Link/info please...

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/mic...re-lawsuit.htm

Pertinent info from the link

Quote:

During my trip to Washington, D.C., I had a chance to catch up on some matters neglected while I was overseas. My attorney may have to file a lawsuit against Mr. Michael Moore. In May we contacted Mr. Moore, through his counsel, about Mr. Moore’s unauthorized use of my work on his website. He did not respond. My attorney has written again. If Mr. Moore and his counsel continue to ignore our correspondence, we will proceed with a lawsuit.

This lawsuit, though, should not be a distraction from combat reporting; the proceedings should be easy and require almost zero hands-on work from me. But it will be potentially costly. I’ve never sued anyone in my life. Looks like Mr. Moore might be the first. I told one very important person recently about the possible upcoming lawsuit and he said something like, “Someone should drive a stake through that guy’s heart.” It won’t be that bad, but copyright cases are interesting and we have to deal with them often. If you want to help me as I both prepare to return overseas and take on this lawsuit with Mr. Michael Moore, please hit the PayPal button. This lawsuit could be expensive for Mr. Moore, as well. My attorney advises that our position is strong. It is senseless for Mr. Moore to ignore this matter.

This is worth a read. I think it gives insight as to how the general thinks about the immediate challenge ahead.

Quote:

Foreign Policy
January 1, 2009
Pg. 48

The General's Next War

The FP interview with Gen. David H. Petraeus

As America’s most famous warrior-scholar looks to export his Big Ideas about fighting wars from Iraq to the arguably even tougher battlefield of Afghanistan, FP’s executive editor, Susan Glasser, spoke with him in the Pentagon days after he took over his new command.

Gen. David Petraeus: In looking at which lessons learned in Iraq might be applicable in Afghanistan, it is important to remember a key principle of counterinsurgency operations: Every case is unique. That is certainly true of Afghanistan (just as it was true, of course, in Iraq). While general concepts that proved important in Iraq may be applicable in Afghanistan—concepts such as the importance of securing and serving the population and the necessity of living among the people to secure them—the application of those ‘big ideas’ has to be adapted to Afghanistan. The ‘operationalization’ will inevitably be different, as Afghanistan has a very different history and very different ‘muscle memory’ in terms of central governance (or lack thereof). It also lacks the natural resources that Iraq has and is more rural. It has very different (and quite extreme) terrain and weather. And it has a smaller amount of educated human capital, due to higher rates of illiteracy, as well as substantial unemployment, an economy whose biggest cash export is illegal, and significant challenges of corruption. Finally, it lacks sufficient levels of basic services like electricity, drinking water, and education—though there has been progress in a number of these areas and many others since 2001.

One cannot adequately address the challenges in Afghanistan without adding Pakistan into the equation. In fact, those seeking to help Afghanistan and Pakistan need to widen the aperture even farther, to encompass at least the Central Asian states, India, Iran, and even China and Russia.

FP: Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were really on the verge of failure. What’s your incoming assessment?

DP: I told [then] Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in September 2005 that Afghanistan would be the longest campaign in the so-called ‘long war.’ That judgment was based on an assessment I conducted in Afghanistan on my way home from my second tour in Iraq. And having been back to Afghanistan twice in recent months, I still see it that way. Progress there will require a sustained, substantial commitment. That commitment needs to be extended to Pakistan as well, though Pakistan does have large, well-developed security institutions and its leaders are determined to employ their own forces in dealing with the significant extremist challenges that threaten their country.

FP: I was rereading an account of an Afghan veteran from Soviet operations there. After every retaliatory strike, he said, ‘Perhaps one mujahideen was killed. The rest were innocent. The survivors hated us and lived with only one idea—revenge.’ Clearly [U.S.] engagement in Afghanistan didn’t start out in the same way as the Soviets’ did, but one of the questions is whether all these occupations wind up similarly after seven years.

DP: A number of people have pointed out the substantial differences between the character of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and that of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, especially in the circumstances that led to the respective involvement, as well as in the relative conduct, of the forces there. Foremost among the differences have been the coalition’s objectives: not just the desire to help the Afghans establish security and preclude establishment of extremist safe havens, but also to support economic development, democratic institutions, the rule of law, infrastructure, and education. To be sure, the coalition faces some of the same challenges that any of the previous forces in Afghanistan have faced: the same extreme terrain and weather, tribal elements that pride themselves on fighting, lack of infrastructure, and so on. In such a situation, it is hugely important to be seen as serving the population, in addition to securing it. And that is why we’re conducting counterinsurgency operations, as opposed to merely counterterrorism operations.

FP: Tell me where you see lessons from Iraq that might not apply in Afghanistan, and things that you will export.

DP: We cannot just take the tactics, techniques, and procedures that worked in Iraq and employ them in Afghanistan. How, for example, do you communicate with the Afghan people? The answer: very differently than the way you communicate with the Iraqi people, given the much lower number of televisions and a rate of illiteracy in the Afghan provinces that runs as high as 70 to 80 percent. Outside Kabul and other big Afghan cities, Afghans don’t watch much television; they don’t have televisions. In Iraq, one flies over fairly remote areas and still sees satellite dishes on many roofs. In Afghanistan, you not only won’t see satellite dishes; you also won’t see electrical lines, and you may not even find a radio. Moreover, you can’t achieve the same effect with leaflets or local newspapers because many Afghans can’t read them. So, how do you communicate with them? The answer is, through tribal elders, via hand-crank radios receiving transmissions from local radio stations, through shura councils, and so on.

FP: What people most want to know, of course, is: Where does this end? The counterinsurgency principles, your own statements in the past, have focused on the idea that such wars end with political solutions—you don’t kill your way out of it.

DP: One of the concepts we embraced in Iraq was recognition that you can’t kill or capture your way out of a complex, industrial-strength insurgency. The challenge in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, is to figure out how to reduce substantially the numbers of those who have to be killed or captured. This includes creating the conditions in which one can have successful reconciliation with some of the elements fighting us. Progress in reconciliation is most likely when you are in a position of strength and when there are persuasive reasons for groups to shift from being part of the problem to becoming part of the solution. In Iraq, that was aided by gradual recognition that al Qaeda brought nothing but indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and an extremist ideology to which the people really didn’t subscribe. Beyond that, incentives were created to persuade the insurgents that it made more sense to support the new Iraq.

The challenge in Afghanistan, of course, is figuring out how to create the conditions that enable reconciliation, recognizing that these likely will differ somewhat from those created in Iraq.

FP: Do you think that does involve speaking with warlords, people like [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar, who up to now have been absolute non-starters?

DP: Any such outreach has to be an Afghan initiative, not the coalition’s. In Iraq, frankly, it was necessary for the coalition to take the lead in some areas where there was no Iraqi government or security presence.

FP: Do you think there is something qualitatively or quantitatively new and different about the insurgencies that U.S. forces have encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan?

DP: We looked at this issue closely when we were drafting the counterinsurgency manual. And we concluded that some aspects of contemporary extremist tactics are, indeed, new. If you look, as we did, at what [French military officer] David Galula faced in Algeria, you find, obviously, that he and his colleagues did not have to deal with a transnational extremist network enabled by access to the Internet. Today, extremist media cells recruit, exhort, train, share expertise, and generate resources in cyberspace. The incidence of very lethal suicide bombers and massive car bombs is vastly higher today. It seems as if suicide car bombs have become the precision-guided munition of modern insurgents and extremists. And while there has been a religious component in many insurgencies, the extremist nature of the particular enemy we face seems unprecedented in recent memory.

Quote:

FP: The counterinsurgency manual, an object of huge praise, is seen as a key moment in the rethink that put the war in Iraq on a different course. But it has not been uncontroversial. There are people on the left who see it as a form of neocolonialism; conservatives are skeptical of anything they see as nation-building, while others believe that by organizing to fight this kind of war, the United States risks not being prepared for a more conventional conflict in the future. How much of an intellectual debate have these principles stirred up? What do you say to these critics?

DP: It’s important to recognize the most important overarching doctrinal concept that our Army, in particular, has adopted—the concept of ‘full spectrum operations.’ This concept holds that all military operations are some mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. In other words, you’ve always got to be thinking not just about the conventional forms of combat—offensive and defensive operations—but also about the stability and support component. Otherwise, successes in conventional combat may be undermined by unpreparedness for the operations often required in their wake.

The debate about this has been a healthy one, but we have to be wary of arguments that imply we have to choose—or should choose—between either stability-operations-focused or conventional-combat-focused training and forces. It is not only possible to be prepared for some mix; it is necessary.

A wonderful essay that I read as a graduate student captures the essence of my view on this. The essay discussed the different schools of international relations theory, and it concluded that ‘the truth is not to be found in any one of these schools of thought, but rather in the debate among them.’ That is probably the case in this particular discussion. We would do well to avoid notions that we can pick and choose the kinds of wars in which we want to be involved and prepare only for them.

FP: You said [that] even in 2005 when you were in Afghanistan, you reported to Secretary Rumsfeld that this could be the longest part of the long war.

DP: I didn’t say it could be. I said it would be. My assessment was that Afghanistan was going to be the longest campaign of the long war. And I think that assessment has been confirmed by events in Afghanistan in recent months.

FP: Just how long did you have in mind?

DP: Those are predictions one doesn’t hazard.

Good things come to those who wait, they will probably blaim it on the CIA. Wait, that sort of makes sense.

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage...cle2146286.ece

Exclusive: Gates Delays Troop Decision
Email
Share February 05, 2009 6:30 PM

ABC News' Luis Martinez reports: ABC News has learned that Defense Secretary Robert Gates has deferred a much-anticipated decision on sending additional troops into Afghanistan until President Obama decides what force levels he wants.

The news comes after an anticipated Pentagon proposal to send three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan -- or 17,000 troops, as reported by ABC News last week -- was presented to Gates for his approval this afternoon.

An element of the Pentagon troop proposal anticipated a large Marine brigade to be followed by two Army Brigade Combat Teams, including a Stryker Brigade. The top U.S. general in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, favors using the armored vehicles as a way of extending his troops' presence to remote regions of Afghanistan.

http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalra...ive-gates.html

for several years, Mike Yon detailed at some length what we had to do to win in Afghanistan. It appears he has changed his mind.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/afg...-come-true.htm

Not so much about Afgan, but in related news:

Al-Qaeda Reportedly Suffers WMD Mishap
Wednesday, Jan. 21, 2009

An apparent mishap during efforts to develop a biological or chemical weapon forced a branch of al-Qaeda to shutter a base in Algeria, a high-level U.S. intelligence official told the Washington Times on
reports that the accident had killed 40 terrorist operatives were accurate, but rejected the claim in the London Sun tabloid that the cause of death was bubonic plague.

An early January message between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and top al-Qaeda officials in Pakistan indicated that a system to prevent the release of a chemical or biological agent had failed, the official said.

"We don't know if this is biological or chemical," the official added.

Al-Qaeda's efforts to develop a biological weapon date back at least to the late 1990s, according to U.S. and Western analysts. The network's program "was extensive, well organized and operated two years before the Sept. 11" strikes, a U.S. commission on unconventional weapons said in a 2005 report.

Another panel of experts said last month that "terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon" (see GSN, Jan. 13).

"This is something that al-Qaeda still aspires to do, and the infrastructure to develop it does not have to be that sophisticated," said Roger Cressey, a former high-level counterterrorism official at the National Security Council (Eli Lake, Washington Times, Jan. 19).

http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090121_4538.php