[smoothmoniker]

Most of the time, when we're talking about cultural relativism, what people usually mean is moral relativism. They don't mean to say (normally) that the musical innovation of Germany in the 1800's was superior to the musical innovation of the Hopi Indians of the same period. What they normally mean to say is that the moral conventions of Germany in the 1800's were superior to the moral conventions of the Hopi Indians of the same period. This is obviously a much more serious statement, and as such more controversial. I'll let Jag dance with pure social relativism, if he wants to.

The relativist holds to one of two basic premises regarding objective moral conventions. Either (1) objective moral values do not exist, or (2) objective moral values exist, but are absolutely unknowable. The result of either proposition leaves the moral ponderer in roughly the same circumstance.

There are some down-stream implications of either of these propositions. Without objectivity, nothing stands outside of any particular cultural convention to critique it. The only critique left would be an internal critique, a criticism that some aspect of a cultural convention doesn't exemplify the basic principles of the culture. For instance, a culture that values human life could be critiqued on the issue of a poorly instituted death penalty, not on the basis of some external standard, but on the basis that it doesn't exemplify the fundamental values of the culture.

This leads to three difficulties that our sense of morality revolts against.

1) There is no possible means of evaluating between two cultures. A culture that values charity and compassion toward the poor cannot be said to be "better" than a culture that values abusing women and prostituting children, as long as both are representing well-integrated expression of their basic principles. As long as the misogynistic culture really and truly holds to the value of misogyny, then they are not in error, on the relativists view. There is no sense in which the word "better" can be used outside of a strictly limited cultural scope.

2) Strict equivalence. Not only can we not say that one culture is better than another, the relativist is also bound to defend the idea that both cultures are strictly and exactly the same, morally. The misogynistic culture and the compassionate culture are strictly, exactly, perfectly the same morally. Our sense of right and wrong revolts at the very idea.

3) The impossibility of moral progress. This is maybe the most difficult one. Ignore the idea of two different cultures now, and thing about the same cultural group over time. Think of Germany in 1939, and Germany in 2005. The relativism is bound to defend the idea that the culture has not progressed morally. Moral progress has two necessary conditions that relativism doesn't allow: an objective goal, and a standard measure of deficiency. A sprinter who exhibits progress does so against an objective measure (covering the same distance in less time) and with a standard measure of deficiency ( a stopwatch and a set marked off distance). A relativist is not allowed either of those tools.

Think of the tremendous progress that the United States has made in the area of human rights. 150 years ago, I could have gone to an auction and purchased another human being, used him in any way I saw fit, abuse his body, his spirit, his family, and take his life. The moral conventions allowed it.

Today, that same man enjoys full equality under the law, the same rights and privileges that any human being holds, the right to compete for the same educational and business opportunities that I compete for, and the right to pursue the life of his choosing. This is no small difference.

The moral relativist is not allowed to call this progress.

-sm