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Originally Posted by yesman065

Public opinion, of course, can change. In 1973, 1974 and 1975, Congress undoubtedly felt it was reflecting the country's disillusionment with the Vietnam War, and it forced a disengagement over the Nixon administration's strong objection. Yet military historians are coming to a consensus that by the end of 1972, there was a much-improved balance of forces in Vietnam, reflected in the 1973 Paris agreement, and that [b]Congress subsequently pulled the props out from under that balance of forces -- dooming Indochina to a bloodbath.

If America had pulled props out from under Saigon's army, then why did that army never once stand on its own with props? As made so obvious in Halberstam's 1965 "Making of a Quagmire" and Sheehan's "Bright Shining Lie", Saigon's army never operated under stress without full American support.

A classic example was Saigon's attack on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos with multiple divisions, full supplies, and American airpower in support. This time, American units were not in that operation. Communists simply let Saigon drive deep into Laos - and then destroyed those Saigon divisions. Whole Saigon units would disappear. Classic Diem Bien Phu. How could this be? America provided everything including air power and supplies. But American troops were not part of the invasion. Saigon’s soldiers did not trust their officers. Proven but again, Saigon never had a viable army.

Why? 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. Saigon never had a viable government. Lack of support made obvious even in movies such as "Good Morning, Vietnam" and "Full Metal Jacket"(?). How bad was it? What was even a biggest source of Communist supplies? The US.

Things were so bad that Le Duc Tho would provide Kissinger with N Vietnam secret assessments complete with time lines. Paris negotiators were simply reminding Kissinger how bad things were in Saigon. Saigon fell apart faster than even N Vietnamese estimated because - 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. S Vietnam never really had a viable government - in 1963 Halberstam's book or in 1973. It is total nonsense to believe America could keep supporting a full scale war where it was actually supplying both sides and where insurgents were far stronger. Insurgents repeatedly avoided confronting direct attacks making Saigon appear equal only on paper.

Gen Petreaus constantly repeats what everyone here should now know. He says he cannot win “Mission Accomplished”. As was also true in Nam, he is correct. Petreaus says he can achieve stunning tactical victories - just like in Nam. Made to look even better because insurgencies don’t confront 'surges'. Where is that strategic objective? Americans cannot achieve a strategic victory - just like in Nam and for obvious reasons. If you are not hearing Petreaus, well, he is making that point painfully obvious to those who understand basic military concepts.

A strategic objective can only be achieved by Iraq's government. As made just as obvious in Halberstam's book, et al, Iraq's army also will only be as viable as its government. Maliki's administration is about as incompetent as the many who preceded him. But then who supports Maliki? Same Americans who also believed Chalibi.

Number one problem - widespread government corruption. Deja vue Nam complete with American supplies flowing to the enemy. Other problems include a government more interested in partisan politics than a national agenda. Who visits province chiefs to gain their support? The Maliki government? Of course not. Just as John Paul Vann and others had to do in Nam, so Americans do in "Mission Accomplished". In both wars, the national government had little public support. Americans bought support then and pay for it now. Support did not come from people working for their country.

American presidents in both wars said otherwise. Maliki's government only has support when it is convenient for others to support him. Maliki is a good source for American handouts. Maliki's government is a government of convenience as demonstrated by four years - and still Iraq has no viable army.

Rocket man can setup across the river to attack the green zone. Nobody saw anything? Of course not. Rocket man is not the enemy. Insurgents could spend all morning outside Abu Ghriad setting up mortars even with a surveyor transit. Everyone saw it. Nobody said anything? An organized attack on Abu Ghriad was a surprise to Americans? Of course. These same Iraqi were described as welcoming Americans – by whom? Deja vue Nam.

Petreaus says he cannot achieve a strategic victory. He can only give Iraq’s government time to establish itself. But that has not been happening. Worse are the many power brokers (described by Americans as a monolithic Al Qaeda) who would be positioning themselves and supplies for this expected ‘end of calm’.

An insurgency never confronts a traditional military power. When the 1st Marine Division sat in Khe Sanh on the verge of being overrun, meanwhile insurgents were elsewhere. We call that the Tet Offensive. That is what insurgents do. Insurgencies are especially dangerous when quiet; when appear to be defeated.

When insurgents disappear from the battlefield, then tactical victories are proclaimed. It happened in Nam. Many make those claims in "Mission Accomplished". Some actually believe a monolithic Al Qaeda exists – and that it had a capital?

Insurgents are not dumb. They know this 'surge' cannot be maintained. Americans cannot maintain this without a draft. Already 10% of recruits have criminal records. The strain on America is great. When America tapers back, expect to see where insurgents have relocated and who stops working with Maliki. A strategic objective is not being achieved. Everyone would be waiting for a multiparty civil war – ie Lebanon style.

Meanwhile, a country currently with so little violence now has millions of refugees. A number now estimated to increase by 50,000 every month. Is a strategic objective being achieved? Or is a nation slowly readying itself for an expected upturn in civil war. Remember that civil war that we were told did not exist? Same people also claim things are getting better every month. They also proclaim another myth of insurgent united under an Al Qaeda banner. How many lies did Nixon say before Americans finally conceded he was lying? How many lies must George Jr tell before we acknowledge realities in "Mission Accomplished"?

Well, in Nam, the generals lied. At least the Generals are being honest about what they can do in “Mission Accomplished”.

Just like in Nam, when a major offensive is conducted, then the battlefield is devoid of insurgents. That proves we are winning? Even Gen Petreaus says America cannot achieve a strategic objective - another lesson made so obvious from Nam. An offensive with so much quiet is a calm before a storm - as N Vietnam planned for their final victory in early 1970s.

Le Duc Tho even showed their secret assessments to Kissinger knowing full well that America could do nothing. He was simply showing that they also knew what Kissinger knew. The defeat of a corrupt Saigon government was inevitable. Only on paper was Saigon's army an equal. N Vietnam had a government that even many S Vietnamese supported. The Iraqi army repeatedly duplicates Saigon's abilities. Without inclusion of American units, neither army (Saigon or Iraq) could operate in fierce battle. A problem directly traceable to governments that did not work for the country and that were/are even chock full of corruption. Armies that mysteriously lose units as soon as combat gets too dangerous. Deja vue.